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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-vs.-
vVILBUR J. STITES, 
Respondent, 
Appellwnt. 
Case No. 
8419 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts as its Statement of Facts the 
first five paragraphs of Appellant's Brief. 
STA11EMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED AP-
PELLANT'S :\fOTION TO QUASH THE INFOR-
MATION. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE APPEL-
LANT'S MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL AND IN 
ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
POINT III 
TESrl,IMONY THAT APPELLANT WAS ARMED 
WAS NOT IMPROPER. 
POINT IV 
TESTI~IONY OF APPELLANT'S ADMISSIONS 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
POINT V 
rrHE COPY OF CORPORATION .MINUTES WAS 
AD~tJ:ISSIBLE. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED AP-
PELLANT'S ;\IOrriO~ TO QFASH THE INFOR-
_MATION. 
Section 77-21-8 of our Code of Criminal Procedure 
provides two principal methods of charging an offense. 
The part applicable to this appeal reads as follows: 
'' ( 1) rrht' infornlation or indictment may 
charge, and iH valid and sufficient if it charges 
the offense for whieh the defendant is being prose-
cuted in one or more of the following ways : 
* *' * 
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''(b) By stating so much of the definition of 
the offense, either in terms of the common law 
or of the statute defining the offense or in terms 
of substantially the same meaning, as is suffi-
cient to give the court and the defendant notice 
of what offense is intended to be charged." 
The statute (76-13-3, U.C.A. 1953) under which the 
appellant \vas charged reads in pertinent part: 
"* * * and every director, officer, agent or mem-
ber of any corporation or association who em-
bezzles, abstracts or wilfully misapplies any of 
the money, funds or credits of the corporation or 
association; * * * is guilty of a felony, and shall 
be imprisoned in the state prison for not less 
than one year nor more than ten years, and be 
fined in any sum less than $10,000.'' 
The information in this case states: 
"That on or about the 3rd day of December, 
1954, at the County of Cache, State of Utah, the 
said defendant did then and there as a director 
and an officer of a corporation, to-wit a director 
~lind president of Valley Motor Company, a Utah 
corporation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously 
misapply money of the said corporation in the 
amount of $2,000.00 which he had received from 
Robert S. Budge on the sale of an autombile to 
said Robert S. Budge which was the property of 
the said corporation." 
The information in a criminal proceeding must be 
sufficiently definite to ( 1) notify the defendant of the 
charge against him so as to enable him to prepare his 
defense, (2) identify the offense so that the defendant 
can successfully interpose a double jeopardy plea in the 
event of a second prosecution thereon, and (3) apprise 
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the court of the issues before it so that it can properly 
rule on questions of evidence and determine the suffi-
ciency thereof. Leasure v. State, ______ Okla. ______ , 275 P. 
2d 344. Additionally, the information must contain all 
of the elements of the offense charged. The test of 
sufficiency is not whether the information could have 
been made more certain, but rather whether it meets 
the foregoing requisites. Sandy v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 80, 
231 P. 2d 374. 
The complaint made of the information in this case 
was similarly advanced against the information in the 
case of State v. Pritchett, 87 Utah 104, 34 P. 2d 704, rev. 
on reh. 87 Utah 109, 48 P. 2d 451. In its first opinion 
this Honorable Court held in favor of the defendant, 
setting forth its reasons in the following language: 
"It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction 
that an information to withstand an attack by a 
general demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment 
must apprise the accused of the crime charged 
with such reasonable certainty that he can make 
his defense and after verdict and judgment there-
on protect himself against further prosecution 
for the same offense. It is also well settled by 
numerous decisions of this court that where a 
statute uses general or generic terms in defining 
a crime, it is not sufficient that the information 
merely charged the crime in the same general or 
generic terms as those used in the statutory defi-
nition. The particular ads which the accused is 
charged with haYing committed must be alleged 
in the information. • * • 
''It will he observed that the statute under 
. which this prosecution is had uses general or 
generic terms in defining the crime of misapply-
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ing credits of a corporation. That crime may be 
committed in several different ways and by the 
use of various means. The accused is charged 
with using and passing a bank check or draft in 
the sum of $1,642.36. The only language contained 
in the information which is descriptive of the 
check or draft is the amount thereof. It is alleged 
that the instrument was 'drawn on or against' a 
credit at the National Copper Bank from which 
it may be inferred that the National Copper Bank 
was the drawee of the check or draft. The infor-
mation is silent as to the date of the check or 
draft, as to its maker or payee. * * *" 
Upon rehearing, however, and after more extensive 
consideration of the point, this Court reversed its prior 
holding, explaining its decision in part in the following 
language: 
'' * * * A re-examination of the information con-
vinces us that the defendant was specifically 
charged with unlawfully misapplying credits of a 
corporation, and that we therefore misconceived 
the nature of the charge. The gist of the offense 
is that of misapplying credits, and if that result 
is accomplished, the offense is complete irrespec-
tive of the means employed. * * * '' 
( 48 P. 2d at 452) 
The only difference between the information in the 
Pritchett Case and that under consideration here is that 
the former dealt with misapplying credit of a corpora-
tion, whereas the charge here is misapplying money of 
a corporation-an immaterial distinction. This is the 
only case the respondent has been able to find in which 
the Court has passed on a charge laid under the '' mis-
application'' statute. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The reasons for sustaining the information in the 
Pritchett Case are even more applicable to the case at 
bar. rrhis appellant was notified that he was charged 
with wilfully misapplying, as an officer and director of 
a corporation, money of the corporation; that the par-
ticular money in question was a $2,000 sum received 
from Robert S. Budge; that the money was property of 
the corporation as a result of the sale of an automobile 
to Budge; and that the automobile was property of the 
corporation. Additionally, the time and place of the 
offense were specified. Neither the provisions of our 
State and Federal Constitutions nor the decided cases 
require more definiteness than this. 
In broad view, there is only one way in which this 
offense can be committed-by using for some other pur-
pose corporate money which under the law must be used 
for a corporate purpose. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 
120 P. 2d 285. Yet, like any other offense, it may be 
accomplished in detail by a variety of methods. 
The offense of robbery offers an example. It is 
settled law in Utah that the short form information is 
sufficient to charge robbery. State r. Hill, 100 Utah 
456, 116 P. 2d 392; State r. Landrum, 3 Ut. 2d 372, 284 
P. 2d 693; and State r. Robbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P. 2d 
1042. The information may state merely that AB robbed 
CD. Yet, robbery ran be committed by any one of four 
methods and in each category, by as many different acts 
as the pleader's imagination might offer. It can be 
committed by a taking from the person of the victim by 
force or by threat of force; or it may be taken from his 
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immediate presence by either of these. The force itself 
may be applied by club, clenched fist, knife or flat iron; 
the threat of force may accompany the brandishing of 
a gun, a blackjack or a broken beer bottle. So also, in 
this case, the appellant could have used the money to 
buy a refrigerator, or take a vacation, or pay off a 
personal debt, or for any of numberless other purposes 
which he may have thought expedient at the time. 
The appellant contends, however, that this infor-
mation is bad because it contains no allegation of what, 
specifically, he did with the money nor any statement 
of what authority required him to apply it otherwise. 
His brief suggests other questions which he maintains 
should have been answered by the information. But, the 
State is not, and properly should not, be required to 
plead such matters as a part of the information. If the 
appellant has any right to restrict the prosecution in its 
proof, it is by means of a bill of particulars, and no 
clearer case than this for its appropriateness can be 
imagined. See State v. Robbins, supra. 
The appellant places great stress on the holding in 
State 'U. Topham, 41 Utah 39, 123 P. 888, but this Court's 
subsequent views of the Tophmn Case suggests a dis-
tinction. As explained in State v. Zaharapoulos, 60 Utah 
2-±4, 208 p. 493 : 
"* * * The case at bar is not at all analogous, and 
is readily distinguishable from the decided cases 
relied upon by defendant. In those cases it was 
charged that the offenses had been committed in 
divers ways. As an illustration, take the Topham 
Case, wherein it was charged that the offense was 
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committed 'by promises and threats and by divers 
devices and schemes,' without stating any specific 
act or thing done on the part of the accused, or the 
kind or nature of the promises, threats, devices, 
and schemes, or any facts or circumstances what-
ever whereby the accused might know the kind or 
character of the acts constituting the offense with 
which she was charged. In the present case the 
defendant is charged with nothing more than one 
act, that of 'knowingly permitting prostitutes to 
solicit patronage in their [his] place of business,' 
during a certain period, 'on the 25th day of Feb-
ruary, A.D. 1921, and thence continuing until and 
including the 4th day of March A.D. 1921.' The 
exact period of time, place, and names of the 
prostitutes who were permitted to solicit patron-
age for prostitution were specifically stated in 
the charge. What more was needed to advise the 
defendant of the nature of the charge against 
him~ The manner in which the women prostitutes 
solicited patronage of men for the immoral pur-
poses of prostitution was wholly immaterial. The 
gist of the offense was defendant's permitting 
them to solicit in his place of business, the Alco 
Hotel. These facts constituting the essential ele-
ments of the crime with which defendant was 
charged ·were specifically pleaded, together with 
the time, place, and names of the persons permit-
ted to solicit. Every requirement of our statutes 
in a ease of this kind was complied with.'' 
In People v. Hill, 3 Utah 334, 3 P. 75, this Honorable 
Court sustained an indictment which was attacked by 
the defendant as insufficient. The language of that 
opinion is appropriate to this issue. It reads: 
'' * * * It is sufficient if the charge be stated with 
so much certainty that the defendant may know 
what he is called upon to answer, and th~ court 
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how to render judgment. In other words, sub-
stantial justice should be more sought after than 
artificial nicety. The defendant, whether he be 
guilty or innocent, if he understands the English 
language, cannot fail to have understood when 
the indictment was read to him that by it he is 
charged with the embezzlement of $9,000, the 
property of Lucy J. Hill." 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE APPEL-
LANT'S MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL AND IN 
ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
The heart of the appellant's second point is the 
argument that he could not have misappropriated the 
Budge payment because he was his own boss and ac-
countable to no one. The idea is that this was a "one-
man corporation" and appellant was the· man;· conse-
quently, the only duty he owed with respect to these 
funds was a duty to himself. 
The record shows that the Valley Motor Company 
was organized under the incorporation provisions of the 
laws of Utah and received its charter on January 8, 
1954. The appellant was one of the original promoters 
(R. 37). He was present at the first meeting of the 
stockholders and the first meeting of the board of direc-
tors. He was president of the corporation and one of 
its directors (R. 42). For more than a year, the cor-
poration, through the appellant and its other officers 
and agents, carried on the business of an automobile 
agency, entering into numerous contractual arrange-
ments both with the public and with other corporations. 
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Throughout that time, its share-holders, including the 
appellant, enjoyed all the benefits and advantages of 
doing business by the corporate form of organization. 
He now seeks by his argument to deny the corporation's 
existence and to place himself in the role of an indi-
vidual proprietor, or at most, a partner, unfettered by 
the statutes governing the management of corporate 
affairs. The cases hold that he is estopped from doing 
so. He cannot run with the hare and bark with the 
hounds. 
The record contradicts the appellant's claim that 
there was no evidence at the trial of fraudulent intent 
on his part. Following is part of the direct examination 
of Clair Lundberg, a prosecution witness: 
"THE COURT: * * * Go ahead, Mr. Lund-
berg. What did you say and what did Mr. Stites 
say~ 
"A. I said, 'What did you do with the $2,000 
from Bob Budge'' And he said, 'I took that to 
cover another fictitious deal.' 
"Q. Another fictitious deaH 
"A. Yes." 
(R. 104) 
And, on eros~ examination: 
'' Q. Do ~·ou know what he meant by a ficti-
tious deal~ 
''A. I assumed there were other deals where 
money had been taken from the company. 
10 
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'' Q. So you don't know what he meant when 
he said he took the money to cover another 
fictitious deal1 
''A. I assumed there had been other fictitious 
deals. He said, 'I took that money to cover an-
other fictitious deal.' 
''Q. For whom1 
''A. You ask him. I don't know.'' 
(R. 104, 107) 
Wayne Craw testified similarly: 
'' Q. Did you hear Mr. Lundberg ask Mr. 
Stites the question of what he had done with the 
$2,000 of the Budge transaction 1 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. What was his answer, to your recollec-
tion? 
"A. The same as was given by Mr. Lund-
berg. That was a true statement. 
"Q. What was that statement 1 
"A. 'I used that check to cover another fic-
titious deal.' " 
(R. 110-111) 
Jay C. Howell also testified to the defendant's ad-
missions: 
"Q. Now in regard to this conversation that 
was up in this office at this date, did you have a 
conversation with Mr. Stites in regard to funds 
missing from the corporation~ 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Would you state in words or effect, as 
11 
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near as you can, what you said to Mr. Stites and 
what Mr. Stites said to you in respect to that 
matter~ 
* * * 
"A. I asked Webb, 'Webb, you say we've 
been short of money.' I says, 'The reason that 
we've been short of money recently is because of 
poor business practices, or because you've taken 
it for your own use~' He didn't reply. He put 
his head down in his hands like that (indicating) 
and remained for two or three minutes; and final-
ly he came on up and he said, 'We've made some 
poor deals,' and he says, 'I've used the money.' 
(R. 131-132) 
Clair Lundberg was recalled by the defendant and 
testified in part as follows : 
"Dr. Budge called me on the phone and at the 
time that he called-He didn't call me personally. 
He called the office and I think I was about the 
only one around to answer the phone. He said, 
'I have a statement for $2,000, of which I have 
paid. What does it mean~' And I said, 'I don't 
know what it means,' and he said, 'I paid that 
account to Mr. Stites.' This was after the con-
versation we have had with Webb, and I asked 
him at that time what happened with Dr. Budge's 
account. And Dr. Bob said, 'I paid it to Webb.' 
And I said, 'I understand that you paid it to 
Webb," because Webb said that he had taken 
the check and applied it on the fictitious deal that 
I mentioned yesterday, and that's the reason I 
understood it had been paid.'' 
(R. 145) 
POINT III 
TES'l1IMONY THAT APPELLANT WAS ARMED 
WAS NOT IMPROPER. 
12 
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During the examination of prosecution witnesses 
with respect to the appellant's admissions, quoted under 
Point II, defense counsel interposed numerous objec-
tions. In the ensuing discussions between the court and 
counsel on the merits of those objections, the court 
stated that if there were any evidence that the state-
ments were coerced or that the defendant was in any 
manner intimidated, the testimony would be excluded 
(R. 100, 103). In order to rebut any inference of duress 
or intimidation, the district attorney asked his witness 
whether, at the time the admissions were made, anyone 
in the room was armed (R. 124). The witness answered 
that the defendant was armed and the matter was 
dropped insofar as the jury was concerned. There is 
no evidence that the question was not asked in good 
faith or that the district attorney knew what answer 
he would receive. For all that appears, the defendant 
carried a gun everyday and had a permit to do so. As 
a precaution against error, however, the court directed 
that the answer be stricken and admonished the jury to 
disregard it. The statement was not inflammatory and 
there is no showing that the defendant was prejudiced. 
There was no basis for granting a mistrial or a new trial. 
State v. Bechtold, 48 S.Dak. 219, 203 N.W. 511; Harkins 
v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 440, 172 P. 469. 
POINT IV 
TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S ADMISSIONS 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The appellant's statements testified to by Craw, 
Lundberg and Howell were admissions, not confessions. 
13 
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State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572,83 P. 2d 1010; People v. 
Skinner, 123 Cal. App. 2d 741, 267 P. 2d 875. As such, 
they were relevant and competent to prove one or more 
elements of the offense. State v. White, 107 Utah 84, 152 
P. 2d 80. There is no basis for the argument that these 
witnesses \Yere accomplices. 
POINT V 
THE COPY OF CORPORATION MINUTES WAS 
ADMISSIBLE. 
The attorney for the Valley Motor Company testi-
fied that he prepared an agenda of business drawn up 
in the form of minutes and that each item of business 
on the agenda, with some changes, was passed upon by 
the board of directors at a meeting attended by all the 
directors (R. 120). He testified that the original copies 
used at the directors' meeting could not be found but 
that the copy introduced in Exhibit 1 was a true copy 
of the action taken by the board. 
Fletcher in his Cyclopedia· Corporations, Volume 9, 
Sections 4613, 4623, states that where there is a showing 
that originals of corporation documents are lost, de-
stroyed, or otherwise not producible, secondary evidence 
is admissible to prove their contents; and if it be argued 
that the original copies themselves had not been signed 
by the corporation officers, then the rule announced by 
this Court in CojJJHY J{ing .Jlining Company ·r. Hauson, 
52 Utah 605, 176 P. 623, would seem to apply. To use 
the language of that opinion: 
"* * * It is true no record was made of that 
meeting, but tlw artion or proceedings were shown 
14 
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by oral testimony at the hearing, which may be 
done in a proper case. 'Any act of the directors 
may be proven by oral testimony, when it is 
shown that no record was made of such action, 
or when it is shown that if such record was made 
it has been lost.' '' 
This view finds support in Fletcher, supra, Section 2190, 
where it is stated that signing of corporate minutes is 
not essential to their validity and force as evidence. 
To the same effect is Jones Commentaries on Evi-
dence, Second Edition, Section 778. In discussing the 
best evidence rule with respect to corporate acts and 
records, he states : 
''Questions as to the effect of the omission of 
a corporation to record its corporate acts fre-
quently arise in determining the admissibility of 
parol evidence to prove such acts. The records 
of a corporation are prima facie evidence of its 
organization and subsequent proceedings. When 
such records exist, they are the best evidence, 
and the rules of evidence require their produc-
tion. But all the acts of a corporation need not 
be established by positive record evidence. Where 
the records of a corporation are omitted entirely, 
or where they are so carelessly or imperfectly 
kept as not to show the adopti_on of resolutions or 
other acts of the corporation, parol evidence may 
be admitted to show that such resolutions were 
adopted, or that such acts were done, by the 
governing body, unless the law or the charter ex-
pressly and imperatively requires all matters to 
appear of record, and makes the record the only 
evidence. * * * '' 
But assuming the minutes to have been improperly 
admitted, the appellant was not prejudiced thereby. 
15 
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The unauthenticated minutes contained nothing perti-
nent to this case which was not testified to by prosecution 
witnesses (R. 35-46, 49-51), or admitted by appellant 
through his counsel (R. 52-57). He complains, however, 
that the jury may have inferred from the minutes that 
he himself was not in sole control of the corporation. As 
a matter of law, he was not in sole control (Point II, 
supra) and the jury was so instructed (Instruction No. 
4). 
POINT VI 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW. 
The statute in question in this case makes wilful 
misapplication of corporate funds a felony. Its effect 
is to insure the use of corporate funds for corporate pur-
poses. It is beyond argument that payment of corporate 
creditors is one of the fundamental purposes of laws 
governing the disposition of corporate funds. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER. 
Attorney General 
I{. ROGER BEAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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